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democracy
For more than a decade, scholars and policymakers have vigorously debated the
suitability and compatibility of liberal democracy in China and more generally in East
Asia as a whole (Bauer and Bell 1999; Fukuyama, 1995; Chan, 1999; Huntington,
1996). Defenders of so-called “Asian values” have claimed that Western-style liberal
democracy is neither suitable nor compatible with East Asia, where collective welfare,
a sense of duty, and other principles of Confucian social philosophy are deeply rooted
(Zakaria, 1994). As a viable alternative to a liberal democracy based on the principles
of individual rights and social contract theory, the defenders have advocated the “Asian
Way” of “Confucian/Asian democracy” or “controlled democracy” – a paternalistic
form of governance, which supporters of liberal democracy reject as anachronistic and
oppressive rule (Bell, 2003). Despite a decade of intense debate, however, no system-
atic effort to date has been made to determine empirically whether Asian values actu-
ally deter the development of Western-style liberal democracy in Confucian East Asia.
Tradition of the liberal democracy
Democracy is widely accepted as an overarching political ideal in the West, and is
increasingly gaining similar acceptance in the rest of the world. Yet most people are
vague about what democracy actually is. There is still much of discussion and a lot of
different and even conflicting ideas about what constitutes a real democracy. Some
consider a democratic system is one that has elections. Others presume that democracy
protects individual rights. Another standpoint might be that a democratic government
takes good care of its citizens. Still others might say that a democratic power reflects
the will of the people (Dahl, 1985; Schmitter, 1991).
Modern democratic theory prefers the more narrow term “liberal democracy” which
is used by political scientists to describe the form of democracy prevalent in Western
polities and gaining adherents throughout the world. But even the “liberal democracy”
is an uneasy amalgamation of different political theories with different social and po-
litical origins. The term liberalism comes from the root word liberty. Classical liberal-
ism emerged in the early modern world as the philosophy of the new middle classes
who chafed under the restrictions of the feudalism and sought greater liberty to pursue
their economic and social goals outside the constraints of the feudal order. Democratic
philosophy, on the other hand, is both older and newer than liberalism. The Western
idea of democracy began with the Ancient Greeks, especially the Athenians. Athenian
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democracy was based on direct popular decision making. Government decisions were
made in public assemblies in which all male citizens could attend, speak, and vote.
Most public officials were chosen at random, by lot, so that every male citizen had
a roughly equal chance at holding public office (Sandel, 1996).
Athenian democracy died out over two thousand years ago. For almost two millen-
nia there were a few other cases of popular government. Modern theory of self-
-government only emerges as a significant political force in the late 18th century with
the American and French revolutions, and there was a revival of democratic practice in
19th and 20th century. Modern, Western political systems represent a synthesis of lib-
eralism and popular democracy, a compromise between the bourgeois emphasis on
individual liberty and ordinary people’s desire for mass, popular control of govern-
ment. These two elements of Western political systems exist in a kind of dynamic ten-
sion. Liberal democratic Western governments take different form based on different
resolutions of the conflict between these their liberal and their democratic elements.
Western governments simultaneously affirm both the idea of popular sovereignty, that
the people should rule themselves, and the idea that the state should be subservient to
the needs of capitalism; simultaneously preach popular sovereignty and in practice accept
elite domination of the political system; simultaneously proclaim national self determi-
nation and demand the subordination of the nation state to needs of the global capitalist
system. Progressively over 19th and early 20th century the idea of universal voting rights
and popular democracy gained ground over republican elitism (Manin, 1997).
The contradiction between elite rule and rule by the people is the central problem of
democracy in the modern world. Democratic political theory in the second half of the
20th century has consisted largely of attempts to square elite power with notions of
popular rule evoked by the concept of democracy (Schumpeter, 2006; Dahl, 1985;
Etzioni-Halevy, 1993). The prevailing contemporary theory reconciling elite rule with
democratic theory is liberal democracy. Liberal democracy requires open competition
between political elites for mass public support. Thus liberal democracy requires regu-
lar and freely contested elections. It also requires civil liberties – the ability of citizens
to form associations and articulate political ideas free of interference by government.
Liberal democracy requires an active and free civil society characterized by a plurality
of competing groups.
Liberal democratic theories are the prevailing notions of democracy in Western, and
particularly American, political science. Yet there have appeared several challengers.
Among the schools of critics of liberal democracy is participatory democracy (Pate-
man, 1976). Participatory democrats harkens back to the Athenian ideal of a polity that
directly responds to the will of the people and of citizens who develop their social ca-
pacities through active engagement in public life. Participatory democrats do not feel
elite dominated representative democracy is adequate to express the real will of the
people or nature a widely shared democratic ethos. They seek to create new channels to
allow ordinary people a voice not only in government decisions but also in the work-
place and other non-governmental social institutions.
In Europe the major challenger to liberal democratic theory is social democracy
(Tilton, 1990). Social democracy shares with participatory democracy several common
themes, but it places greater emphasis on the importance of social class in understand-
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ing elite dominance within liberal democracy. It is not easy to simply characterize so-
cial democracy, because there are a wide range of theories that have used that label.
Like liberal democracy, social democratic theory recognizes that in contemporary
capitalistic democracies political elites rule and the ordinary citizen is largely a spec-
tator. However, unlike liberal democrats, social democrats do not accept this condition
as natural or desirable. Social democratic theory seeks to empower ordinary people
over against political elites. It points to the conflict between elite rule and popular rule
and sides with the mass of people over against the political elite. Perhaps the most
important difference between the two philosophies is that liberal democrats are com-
placent about the state of contemporary Western democracies while social democrats
take democratic theory as essentially a critical concept, which they turn against politi-
cal elites in all societies, including liberal democracies. Liberal democrats and social
democrats also differ systematically on the relationship between democracy and capi-
talism. Some liberal democrats oppose virtually all forms of what they see as govern-
ment intervention in the private economy. Other liberal democrats favor more activist
government economic policies. But all liberal democrats see a privately controlled
capitalist economy as a bulwark of democratic freedoms. Social democrats on the other
hand view the vast inequalities of a capitalist economic system as fundamentally in-
compatible with democracy. Social democrats view the concentration of wealth and
power in the hands of a tiny minority as inconsistent with the real exercise of popular
rule. The social democrats seek to redistribute wealth and power out of the hands of the
few and into the hands of the many. This requires fundamental changes in economic
institutions. Social democrats recognize that the only way to accomplish this goal is
through government policy.
Throughout the 20th century social democratic parties have contended for power
across Europe and even been the leading party in most Scandinavian countries. But
liberal theories of democracy have generally prevailed in the Western world. However,
in recent years a new challenger to the hegemony of liberal theories of democracy has
arisen, especially in the US-communitarian theories of democracy (Shapiro, 2003). The
exact content of the new theories of communitarian democracy is somewhat vague, but
the flaw in liberal democratic theory that gives rise to communitarian ideas is quite
real. Liberal democratic theory puts great stress on the importance of individual rights,
many would say too much emphasis on rights. The other side of the coin of individual
rights is social responsibilities, obligations, and duties. No one’s individual rights can
be protected unless others recognize their responsibility to respect those rights. Com-
munitarian theories of democracy say liberal democratic theory and practice overlook
this flip side of democratic theory. They point to a wide variety of social ills ranging
from rampant crime, domestic violence, drug abuse, child neglect, the rapid spread of
sexually transmitted diseases, to the abuse of the legal system for frivolous complaints,
which they argue are largely the result of too much stress on individual rights and not
enough emphasis on the rights of the community and the responsibilities of individuals.
Probably more than any other Western theory, communitarian notions of democracy
have the potential to resonate in the East Asian context. Most Asian cultures, particu-
larly Confucian cultures, have put more emphasis on harmony in society than realiza-
tion of the individual, and stressed the duties, rather than the rights, of individuals. For
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centuries Asian critics of the west have decried the rampant individualism of western-
ers. Contemporary East Asian critics of Western democratic theory such as Lee Kwan
Yew of Singapore have argued that is the price of democracy is the disorder and self-
ishness of Western individualism, then the price is too high to pay. While communi-
tarian theorists of democracy would not go that far, they share the same concern that
exclusive emphasis on individual rights does not serve the need for a community of
mutual respect.
From the terminological point of view the promoted by them term “Confucian de-
mocracy” belongs to the wide spectrum of so called “adjective democracies” or
“democracy with the adjectives” which are the attempt of several scholars to answer
the conceptual challenge of the recent global wave of democratization. Even the West-
ern theorists are fully conscious that if the new political regimes in Latin America,
Africa, Asia, and the former communist world share important attributes of democracy,
many of them differ profoundly from the democracies in advanced industrial countries.
Some, it is widely agreed, cannot be considered fully democratic in the liberal demo-
cratic sense. As scholars have attempted to deal analytically with these new cases of
democracy, they seek to increase conceptual differentiation in order to capture the di-
verse forms of democracy that have emerged. An important consequence of the pursuit
of this goal has been a proliferation of alternative forms of the concept, including
a surprising number of subtypes, such as “authoritarian democracy,” “neopatrimonial
democracy,” “military dominated democracy,” and “protodemocracy.”
Most of these new subtypes follow Schumpeter in employing a narrow definition
that equates democracy with elections. This approach, which may be called
“electoralism,” defines democracy as holding elections with broad suffrage and the
absence of massive fraud (Schumpeter, 2006; Kirkpatrick, 1983; Vanhanen, 1992).
Where elections are held and the missing attribute is full suffrage we find terms such as
“oligarchical” or “proto-” democracy. Where elections are basically competitive, but
the attribute of full contestation is missing we find terms such as “controlled” and
“restrictive” democracy. We find also several subtypes that do not meet even an electo-
ralist standard for being democratic – which uses dismissive terms such as “façade” or
“sham” democracy.
Another set of subtypes refers to countries that the observer views as basically
democratic but that are differentiated in terms of the contrasting ways in which they are
seen as “problematic,” i.e., they do not meet a larger set of expectations about what
democracies should be like. To the orthodox followers of the liberal democratic
thought the most democracies in Asia show significant deviations in form and sub-
stance when compared to liberal democracy in Western Europe and North America, the
liberal and even democratic character of these regimes is often doubted (Neher and
Marlay 1996; Zakaria, 2007). Depending on the observer’s theoretical preferences,
analytical tools and, last but not least, his/her normative ideals, democracies in Asia are
classified as “Asian-style democracy” (Neher and Marlay, 1996), “illiberal democracy”
(Bell, 2000) or “Confucian democracy” (Chaibong, 2003). It should be noted that
“Confucian democracy” is much more than just a theoretical concept or just the voice
in the internal democratic quarrels. It is full of ideological, cultural and social content,
which I try to discuss below.
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Asian/Confucian values and democracy
Cultural determinism argues that cultural values condition modes of social and eco-
nomic organization, including patterns of political relationships and political system
(Harrison, 1992). Can be said that societies or regions, which embrace a common cul-
tural heritage, may evolve political and social arrangements distinct from the other
regions representing different sets of values. Cultural approaches in the sociology and
anthropology are very popular since the famous Max Weber’s work on the influence of
the Protestant and Catholic ethics for economic development. Continuation of such
cultural dimension one can find in the Samuel Huntington’s concept of the clash of
civilizations. According to him the fundamental source of conflict in the modern world
will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic, but the cultural one.
Huntington similarly as Weber presumes that culture is the primary source of all the
other social, political and economic systems (Huntington, 1996; 1993).
Of course we can also find the contrary views, which hold that culture is declining
as a determinant of domestic and international politics in the context of globalizing
pressures. This process is leading to the convergence of political and economic prac-
tices and the spread of democracy have similarly led to arguments of growing similari-
ties, which have implications for cultural differences. Famous Japanese social scientist
– Francis Fukuyama argued that the spread of free market economics and democratic
politics is a process, which is leading to the increased homogenization of all societies
regardless of their historical origins or cultural inheritances. The inevitable prolifera-
tion of democracy, in its Western, liberal model is, according to him, only one example
of this process (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1991).
The debate over the Asian, or more narrowly Confucian values, and its potential in-
fluence to the political systems in the East Asian states is at the heart of this contro-
versy. The extraordinary economic growth experienced within East Asian countries –
have made the “Asian values” debate particularly vital. The concept of “Asian values”
presumes that the social, economic and political characteristics of certain Asian coun-
tries are based upon a shared value system which is identifiable and distinct and which
transcends national, religious and ideological differences. It maintains that cultural
values have underpinned not only the “economic miracle” of East Asian countries but
also conditioned the orderly social and political characteristics of the region (Lee,
1993; Mahathir, 1995).
Concept of “Asian values” was and is very politicized and contested methodologi-
cally. The idea of one cultural values system present in the East Asia as a whole seems
to be easily falsifiable. A number of these values have been seen within the context of
the Confucian tradition, despite the difficulties of applying this to East Asia generally.
Confucianism, as an amalgamation of religious and philosophical thought, is most
closely associated with to Chinese traditional society than to the “Asian values” in
contemporary East Asia. However, a number of analysts have somewhat artificially
broadened its influences throughout the region (Lawson, 1996).
The politicized nature of the debate on the cultural influence to the political system
derives partly from the manner in which “Asian values” are often pitted, against
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“Western values.” Sometimes the renaissance of “Asian values,” in parallel to an eco-
nomic renaissance is paranoically contrasted to socially and economically deteriorating
Western societies with the breakdown of the family, decadence, excessive individual-
ism and ill discipline. Some have pointed that the concept of “Asian values” has ap-
peared in a group of countries (e.g. Singapore and Malaysia) where the civil and politi-
cal liberties were at least disputable, has not been complete freedom for opposition
parties, freedom of speech, a separation of powers, or civil and political rights as con-
ceived in Western political thought. In societies where the emphasis is upon consensus
and harmony, especially when pursuing economic growth, it has proved possible to
deem opposition as subversive. Cultural values can be a tool to control dissent – said
critics (Kim, 1994; Freeman, 1996).
Finally political version of “Asian values” has appeared as the sign of defensiveness
in the region and the broad critic to the “undemocratic” East Asian countries mani-
fested at the time of the UN Human Rights Conference in Vienna 1993. The Asian
position, elaborated at a Bangkok summit prior to the UN conference, was that they
would not accept a declaration, which put the rights of the individual above the needs
of society and the right to live in an environment of social and political order (Bang-
kok, 1993; Moody, 1996).
So is the concept of the “Asian/Confucian values” totally artificial political tool?
Not really. Some common characteristics of East Asian societies may be empirically
found – like group orientation and concentration on the interests of the community
before those of the individual. Some scholars like Roger T. Ames stress the specific
communitarian construction of East Asian societies, where the individual “is not an
isolated being, but a member of a nuclear and extended family, clan, neighborhood,
community, nation and state” (Ames, 1998). Behavior is there motivated not by con-
cerns of individual rights but equally by duties and responsibilities. The societies in
consequence are less atomized and less conscious of the – typical for the liberal West –
rights of individuals. Group orientation is also associated with values such as self-
-discipline and personal sacrifice to the greater good, looking for the social harmony,
respect for family ties and filial piety. The government in such society has clear target
– must secure an orderly society which curtails the excesses of individualism or look
for a balance between civil liberties and social stability (Mahbubani, 1995).
The influence of the Confucian tradition present in the contemporary “Asian val-
ues” system has given rise to the concept of “Confucian democracy” (Bauer and Bell,
1999). Confucianism has no single accepted influence, but it advocates ethical proper-
ties to private and public relationships, which appear to suggest an acceptance of hier-
archy and the need for social harmony, respect and reverence for family and benevo-
lence in government. In political terms this might appear to consolidate the state’s
authority in the interests of the “common good” and create a submissive population,
which accepts hierarchy and seniority. Some adherents of the “Asian/Confucian de-
mocracy” model argue that a Confucian democratic theory grows out of Confucianism,
not in any teleological sense, but through the continuation of the Confucian tradition of
interpretation and immanent critique (de Bary, 1993). What emerges is not Confucian
liberal democracy – a reconciling of Confucian and liberal democratic political thought
– but rather a Confucian democratic theory, a democratic resolution of complementary
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strains within Confucian political thought. Reconciling these strains requires reinter-
preting the virtue of ren while upholding it as a foundational virtue. It requires favoring
the view of human nature that requires less deference to hierarchy and yet understand-
ing both sides of the debate about human nature as requiring institutions to cultivate
ren. Finally, but essential to the first two, a Confucian democracy requires reading
Confucianism as a tool for social and political criticism and thus for not only allowing
but requiring institutional space for continuous contestation and background conditions
that enable people to access the space of contestation.
As I have previously mentioned many scholars tried to formulate the ideal model of
“Confucian/Asian Democracy” (Bauer and Bell, 1999). Nonetheless, no consensus yet
exists among scholars on what it constitutes. Confucianism is a moral code of ethics
that emphasizes personal virtues rather than individual rights. In this virtue-based mo-
rality, the concept of rights is not deemed essential for human well-being. Conse-
quently, any talk of rights is discouraged, while the sense of community is stressed
(Lee, 1993; Bauer and Bell, 1999). In politics, rule of virtue, not rule of law, is advo-
cated and justified as the ideal mode of governance. Individuals are required to define
their interests in terms of the interests of the communities to which they belong. In the
Confucian notion of government, therefore, there is no place for the concept of indi-
vidual rights in society and politics.
Confucian morality also emphasizes family honor and filial piety. Relations within
a family are not based on the notion of contract or the impersonal calculation of bene-
fits and costs. Instead, they are based on the principles of filial piety and loyalty, which
stress family obligations and family welfare. The metaphor of the household power-
fully serves as the proper code of social and political behavior. In Western moral tradi-
tion, however, a person is viewed as a separate and independent entity whose dignity
depends on personal liberty. Individuals are treated as morally autonomous and capable
of conducting their lives as they see fit. Each individual relates to society through mu-
tual consent with other individuals. The very idea of individual autonomy and the no-
tion of social contract are at the core of liberal democracy, which stresses the impor-
tance of personal liberties and rights. The Western conception of rule of law is advo-
cated to protect these liberties and rights from the state’s arbitrary use of power. The
morality of liberal democracy is primarily rights-based. In Western societies, signifi-
cant moral goods include freedom, independence, selfdetermination, and individual
rights.
In short, the Confucian moral tradition is qualitatively different from the Western
moral tradition. The former stresses the norms of social obligations and collective good
and the practice of fulfilling duties and living up to social-relational standards. In
striking contrast, the latter emphasizes the principles of individual freedom and auton-
omy and the practice of respecting the rights of other people.
The core elements of Asian values that reflect Confucian morality are often differ-
entiated into two broad types, Asian social values and Asian political values. The for-
mer features social collectivism and deals primarily with the norms of interpersonal
life, including filial piety and family loyalty, respect for authority based on seniority,
the primacy of community over individual, and the priority of collective order over
personal freedom. The latter features political paternalism and focuses on the norms
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and practices of government, including those of benevolent paternalism, the moralistic
role of the state, and anti-adversarial or consensual governance. Both types of values
are rooted in the Confucian conception of self as an interdependent entity and that of
family as the prototype of social and political institutions.
Anyway Confucian democracies much differ from the liberal democratic ideal.
Most have just evolved from authoritarianism to some form of democracy, in the sense
of having more or less limited elections. But strong government responsible for the
securing collective needs with an absence of many Western democratic practices is still
one of the basic norms of this model. As the most perfect example of the “Confucian
democratic” model many scholars describe the case of Singapore ruled since independ-
ence by the People’s Action Party with its famous prime minister Lee Kuan Yew – by
the way one of the most well known supporter of the “Asian/Confucian values” ideol-
ogy in the politics. Apart of it there are several governments in the East and Southeast
Asian nations – both with clear (China, Taiwan) and not so clear (Malaysia, Thailand)
Confucian heritage which recognize such model of democracy as the most proper to
the local social and historical environment.
This ethos continues in some other cases, albeit in a diluted form. A strong bureauc-
racy and an absence of the separation of powers are still characteristics of almost all
East Asian states – even those which have chosen theoretically Western – liberal
democratic form of government. Maybe because of it Samuel Huntington broadly sug-
gested that Confucian or Confucian-influenced societies are inhospitable to democracy
(Huntington, 1991). Many critics of the “Asian/Confucian values” ideology point that
there is rather difficult to talk about East Asia as about a coherent, ahistorical, mono-
lithic bloc. Much of the mentioned debate consider as a reflection of East Asian politics
but not necessarily East Asian values. Several opponents state that every East Asian
value exists to some extent in the West and the contest between liberal and Asian de-
mocracies is not in fact the contest between the civilizations or cultures but between
authoritarian and democratic tendencies present worldwide. In this context it is worth
to have a look on the real set of values shared by the members of East Asian societies.
Asian/Confucian values in action
David Hitchcock is an author of one of the most popular research on the “Asian
values” conducted in a number of East Asian countries, including Singapore, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Thailand, China, Korea and Japan and confronted with the “western” system
of the United States. In 1994, for a report on Asian values and the United States: How
much conflict?, he has asked 100 East Asian specialists and so called “opinion leaders”
to indicate the most important personal and societal values and qualities. They were
asked also to indicate the key values for people in their country, not for themselves. As
a comparative group of respondents representing “Western” civilization Hitchcock has
served the group of political and intellectual American elite (Hitchcock, 1994).
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In the Hitchcock survey there have appeared two list of values. One has listed so
called personal values and qualities like: self-reliance, hard work, respect for learning,
honesty obedience to parents, helping others, follow religious teachings, self-discipline,
inner self-fulfillment, personal achievement, fulfilling obligations to others and
achieving success in life. From another list the respondents have to check critically
important societal values. Hitchcock has placed on this list following qualities: respect
for authority, decision by majority, preserve harmony for the group, orderly society,
rights of society, personal freedom, open to new ideas, rights of the individual, consen-
sus, accountability of public officials, resolve conflicting political views through pri-
vate consultation, thinking for oneself, freedom of expression and resolve conflicting
political views through open debate. One can easily find that on the both lists the val-
ues, Hitchcock has placed equal number of “idealized” Asian/Confucian values con-
trasted to the “idealized” Western values and qualities. On the basis of his research
American scholar wanted to evaluate how strong and durable are traditional Confucian
values in the East Asian societies. On the other hand he wanted also to learn how large
is the “values gap” between the West and East and how potentially it may shape the
political order in the both civilization circles. The results of the Hitchcock’s survey are
presented on the charts below.
As Hitchcock mentioned, only two of the top five personal values identified were
common to both East Asians and Americans: hard work and self-reliance. Honesty was
sixth on the American list and third for East Asian respondents. Two of the top six
societal values/qualities were also common to both East Asians and Americans: free-
dom of expression and official accountability. On the all other levels there has ap-
peared quite significant gap between the key values of the West and the East. The larg-
est in the personal values/qualities list was in how each group scored “respect for
learning” and “obedience to parents.” The largest gap between East Asian and Ameri-
can replies on the list of societal values/practices was over the importance each attrib-
uted to an “orderly society” (71 per cent of the East Asians versus 11 per cent of the
Americans); “personal freedom” (82 per cent of the Americans versus 32 per cent of
the East Asians); and “individual rights” (78 per cent of the Americans versus 29 per
cent of the East Asians). The percentage of East Asians indicating as “critically impor-
tant” “decision by majority” or “decision by consensus” was, however, approximately
the same as in the United States. And the percentage supporting “resolve conflicting
political views through open debate” or “through private consultation” was identical –
an interestingly high total for “majority” and “open decisions.” Of course these figures
were only based on the judgment of a sophisticated group of people in seven countries,
attempting to guess the views of others in their country. In general researches of David
Hitchcock gave a strong empirical support to the followers of the ideological version of
Confucius/Asian values. First of all they show the relative durability of the traditional
system of values among the East Asian societies. But they also suggested that the fol-
lowers of cultural determinism in the shaping of political systems may have right. Sev-
eral “important values” to the Asian respondents were far away from the core values
supporting the liberal democracy model of politics.
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Although since the first project of Hitchcock several similar researches have been
conducted. The outcomes of most of them doesn’t confirm the main conclusion of the
American author and challenge the ground for cultural determinism as a tool to explain
the contemporary systems in the East Asia. For example in 2003 a group of my stu-
dents from the University of Warsaw has started the research program on the presence
of traditional Confucian/Asian values among the academic youth in the East Asian
countries. Using the methodology of survey work out by David Hitchcock we began
the researches in Vietnam on the much larger samples than those proposed by Hitch-
cock. We have also tried to eliminate some overgeneralizations conducting each of the
segment of the researches separately. Our research team has questioned 498 students
from the five largest academic institutions of Hanoi (National University of Hanoi,
Hanoi Foreign Trade University, Hanoi Medical University, Hanoi University of Tech-
nology, Hanoi University of Journalism and Propaganda). Analyses of the outcomes of
ours researches compared to the Hitchcock project has shown significant differences.
The results of the Hanoi research combined with the results of Hitchcock’s are pre-
sented on the charts below (Jelonek, 2004).
It is not difficult to find that some of the values like “hard work,” “honesty” or
“obedience to parents” still according to the Hanoi’s students, play important role in
the Vietnamese society. Some of them are pointed by less respondents than in the
Hitchcock’s survey by we should take into account that the age and status of the re-
spondents in the latter sample probably has correlated with more conservative attitudes.
Some of the answers in the Vietnam 2003 project show that traditional – values like
“help others” are even more important to the Vietnamese youth than to Hitchcock’s
respondents.
On the other hand we can find that in the societal values the attitudes of the Viet-
namese youth are significantly far away from the traditional Confucian/Asian model
proposed by Hitchcock. It is particularly visible in the less frequent pointing of
“Harmony” or “Orderly society as the crucial social values in the ‘Vietnam 2003’.” We
can find also significant support of the Vietnamese students to such “liberal” or
“Western” values like “personal freedom,” “individual rights” and “open debate.” Al-
though the Confucian/Asian values are not totally contested by the new generation it is
appearing a new “hybrid” system of values adopting several “Western” ideas and par-
ticularly these which may support development of more liberal models of political
system. Similar findings have been confirmed by researches conducted by the Institute
of Sociology in Warsaw in Taiwan and Korea.
It seems that replies to probing on “Asian/Confucian values” did not totally support
the concept of an “Asian/Confucian way” and that the ground for “Asian/Confucian
democracy” is shrinking. Several Asian scholars themselves express similar attitude.
There is growing skepticism in the region about the degree to which the word “Asia”
itself has much meaning beyond the geographical one. The diversity of the region –
racial, cultural, religious, historical – seriously complicates the possibility of defining
an “Asian/ Confucian” form of democracy.
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Conclusions
Although in some areas, the priority of certain values in the East Asia and the West
appear to be quite different, we can observe some symptoms of their convergence.
Growing economic interdependency and advances in communications gradually reduce
the significance of traditional values. Differences certainly exist but rather seem to be
diminishing through ongoing process of globalization and modernization.
In the rapid changing East Asia the priority of political liberalization tends to be
a lesser one. But priorities are the dynamic issue and can rapidly change. Democratiza-
tion is undeniable and inevitable aspect of the modernizing world. As other processes
like industrialization, urbanization, secularization political change must occur in all the
countries of the world. However modernization doesn’t have to mean deculturalization
and obvious fading of characteristic values of East Asian countries. As we can find in
the outcomes of the social researches the traditional Asian/Confucian values are still
present in the minds of the Asian societies. They should be taken into account in the
construction and analyzes of East Asian political systems.
Asian leaders decisively deny the weakening of cultural values in the context of the
internationalization of production, rapid growth and advances in communication. For-
mer Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad stressed, “Asian modernization
has occurred as an inevitable stage of our history, not because we were Europeanized
or Americanized” (Mahathir, 1995). According to him Asian democratization shouldn’t
also mean Westernization. Although such cultural relativism is wildly attacked and
criticized we can find in it at least a grain of truth.
The idea that there are different types of modernity – “multiple modernities” – is
actually prevailing one in the social sciences. It is explained that we have many dy-
namic systems that converge to multiple steady-state equilibria. This same model
might be applied to the democratization processes in East Asia. There is no evidence
that the “Confucian/Asian” democracy model proclaimed by several Asian politicians;
analyzed and often criticized by several Western scholars will be the final state of
“equilibrium” for the Asian modernity. Probably it will be not. But we may be sure that
it is located somewhere on the road to the Asian version of political modernity – which
inevitable will be shaped in the context of “Asian/Confucian values.”
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